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Abstract 
The members of the European Parliament are organized in political groups, referred to as 
European party groups. Within these European party groups there is a leadership consisting of a 
chairman and several vice-chairman. This leadership has a notable influence on some of the 
inner working of the groups, such as the assignment of committees and rapporteurships. 
However, not much is known about which factors contribute to gaining such a leadership 
position. The European Parliament is made up of members who have no previous political 
experience at all, as well as a variety of members who have been previously elected into 
assemblies and governments on national, regional and local levels. In this thesis the effect of 
cabinet experience on gaining a leadership position will be tested for. Secondly, the importance 
of seniority in politics and how this relates to seniority within the European Parliament, will be 
analyzed. 
Original data on previous political experience, seniority and leadership positions of the members 
from the two biggest political groups; the Europeans People’s Party Group (EPP), the 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), as well as the influential Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) were gathered. A binary logistic regression was 
conducted, including control variables, the results confirmed that members of the European 
Parliament who have been part of a cabinet are more likely to gain a leadership position. 
Seniority however does not have a significant effect on gaining a leadership position.  
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Introduction 
Politics in the European Parliament can be very complex compared to politics in national 
institutions, partly because there are so many countries involved that do not share the same 
culture and history. Studying the European Parliament however can tell one more about the 
complexity in the European Parliament, and is also useful for understanding politics in other 
international parliamentary assemblies (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2006, p. 494).  
Since MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) are elected through national elections, and 
then serve five years in the European Parliament, careers are formed in a new unique way. MEPs 
are expected to be loyal towards their national party but also towards their European party group 
(EPG) (Meserve, Pemstein, & Bernhard, 2009, p. 1016). As national parties decide who is 
allowed to stand for election to the European Parliament, the careers of MEPS are dependent on 
the choices of their national parties (Whitaker, 2014, p. 1509). Despite this, a wide range of 
professional backgrounds are ascribed to MEPs, from government ministers to local politicians. 
Their careers are of importance as they form a link between the various professions where they 
have served and can influence behavior (Daniel, 2015, p. 4). Secondly, careers can influence the 
prestige and performance of a political institution;  having high turnover rates or only a small 
elite of politicians with an extensive political career affects a political institution’s development 
(Daniel, 2015, p. 7). Furthermore the European Parliament has become increasingly 
professionalized, and professionalization is connected to political careers (see Bochert and Stolz, 
2011; Norris, 2009). Though there has been research on career trajectories of MEPs (see 
Scarrow, 1997; Daniel, 2015), this has not extended to party leaderships. Therefore not much is 
known about which factors or careers paths explain who gets a leadership position, chairman or 
vice-chairman, within an EPG (Hix & Høyland, 2014, p. 598). The increase in legislative powers 
of the European Parliament has made high ranking offices in the European Parliament, such as 
party leadership, more significant (Whitaker, 2014, p. 1511). The lack of knowledge on which 
factors which are of influence on gaining a leadership positions within an EPG, together with its 
growing importance makes studying this office worthwhile. Though there has been done 
research on rapporteurship- and committee allocation (see Daniel, 2015; Kaeding, 2004; 
Yordanova, 2009) which shows that expertise and interest in the committee’s subjects are of 
importance, it is difficult to link these findings to the leaderships of EPGs. 
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Since careers within European Parliament might also be of influence on gaining a leadership 
position, seniority will be analyzed as well. Seniority is an important principle in parliaments 
such as the American House of Representatives and the Swedish parliament (see Kellerman & 
Shepshle, 2009; Hagevi, 2000). However whether seniority has an effect on gaining a leadership 
position within an EPG is also unknown. The number of terms an MEP has served in the 
European Parliament will therefore be taken into account.  
As the influence of the European party groups EPP (European People’s Party Group), S&D 
(Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats) and ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe) on the workings of the European Parliament is big, and because they 
account for a majority of the MEPs the members of those political groups will be analyzed. My 
research question thus is: Is previous political experience as well as seniority within the 
European Parliament of influence on gaining a leadership position within the political groups 
EPP, S&D and ALDE? 
To be able to answer the research question, the development and powers European Party Groups 
and their leaderships will be described firstly. Secondly, the importance of political experience 
and seniority will be analyzed. Lastly, the case selection, data and methodology, and results will 
be discussed. 
 
European party groups 
Development 
Over the past decades the European Parliament has experienced a noticeable growth; in 1970 it 
consisted of just 142 members from six different countires, currently it consists of 751 members 
coming from 28 different countries (Kreppel, 2002, p. 95; European Parliament, n.d.
a
). Not only 
has the European Parliament grown in size over the years, it also has become more powerful and 
now has legislative-and budgetary powers, as well as an influence on the appoint of the 
Commission of the European Union (Raunio, 2012, p. 365). 
Since the fifties of the 20
th
 century European party groups have formed in the predecessors of the 
European Parliament (Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011, p. 107). Their role was however 
marginal and inferior compared to the national parties (Hix & Lord, 1997, pp. 13). After the first 
direct elections of the European Parliament in 1979 the EPGs became more important though 
(Bardi, 1994, pp. 364-365). The EPGs also became more cohesive during the eighties and 
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nineties of the previous century as increased parliamentary power meant that they gained more 
responsibilities and started receiving significant financial and secretarial means, coming from the 
official budget of the European Parliament (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 14 & p. 61).  
Nowadays there are several conditions which must be met before a group of MEPs with the same 
political affiliation is recognized as an official EPG; the group must have at least 25 members, 
who represent at least a quarter of the 28 current member states (European Parliament, n.d.
b
). 
Being part of an EPG gives an MEP more influence since the groups are of great importance in 
the European Parliament. They are a means of forming coalitions in order to pass legislation, 
furthermore they choose the presidency of the European Parliament, set up the parliamentary 
agenda  and allocate speaking time (Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2011, p. 105).  
 
Group structures and powers 
Within the EPG’s there is a hierarchical structure consisting of a chairman, several vice-
chairmen, a bureau and several working groups (Hix and Lord, 1997, p, 61; Corbett et al., 2011, 
p. 142 ).  The chairmen are elected just before the start term of a new term during a group session 
(European People’s Party Group, 2014;  Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, 
2014). After two and a half years the groups have the opportunity to elect a new leadership, but 
usually the chairmen keep their position for several years (Corbett, Jacobs & Shackleton, 2007, 
p. 101).  
The leadership, the chairman and vice-chairmen, are supported by a secretarial staff and have a 
significant influence as they are the visible face of the group in the European Parliament and in 
external meetings (Ringe, 2010, p. 18). Within the group they set up the agenda for the meetings 
of the group and make decisions about the groups ideological position concerning policy, usually 
together with the bureau. The bureau is responsible for the group’s strategy and policy (European 
People’s Party Group, n.d.; Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, n.d.). Most 
importantly, the leadership is influential regarding the allocation of commissions and 
rapporteurships (Hix, 2005, p. 91). McElroy (2008) for example shows that the leadership of 
EPGs uses its influence on the allocation on commissions to reward members who have been 
loyal to the group by voting along party lines during roll call votes (McElroy, 2008, pp. 368-
369). The chairman and vice chairmen are part of the bureau, together with heads of national 
delegations, chairs of committees belonging to the group and members who are part of the 
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bureau or presidency of the European Parliament. The bureau of the S&D’s has a slightly 
different composition as consists just of the chair and vice-chairmen and no other members 
(Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, n.d.).  
The leaderships of the EPGs do not only have certain powers within their groups, they can also 
exert influence on some of the inner workings of the European Parliament in the ‘Conference of 
Presidents’. The chairmen of the different EPGs and the president of the European Parliament, 
who presides over the ‘Conference’, meet twice a month. Together they are responsible for 
maintaining relations with national parliaments and other institutions within the European Union, 
they also makes decisions about the responsibilities of committees and delegations and set up the 
agenda for the plenary meeting of the European Parliament (European Parliament, n.d.
b
).  
 
 
Political careers 
As referred to by Hix and Høyland (2014), not much is known about which factors might be of 
influence on gaining a leadership position within an EPG. It is therefore useful to first analyze 
committee-and rapporteurship assignment. Experience in a national parliament or government 
does not have a significant influence on the allocation of rapporteurships (Kaeding, 2004, pp. 
365-366). However, being a rapporteur is a different job to leading an EPG.  As shown by Daniel 
(2015) rapporteurships require a great deal of a certain sorts of professional expertise, as there is 
a tsignificant effect of  advanced education on rapporteurship assignment (Daniel, p. 83 & pp. 
88-91). Rapporteurs are primarily concerned with legislative work and proposals and consult 
with specialists (European Parliament, 2006). Committees which are technical and information-
driven also mainly attract members with a certain education and professional expertise. The 
committees which are less technical mainly attract MEPs who have a professional background 
which relates to the committee’s area of interest (Yordanova, 2009, pp. 269-273). As 
rapporteurship- and committee allocation is based more on expertise and  professional 
backgrounds, instead of political experience, it is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding 
EPGs’ leaderships. Therefore analyzing the professionalization and development of political 
careers might clarify more. 
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Professionalization at the state level, regionalization and the emergence of supranational 
institutions such as the European Parliament, have made political careers more attractive over the 
years and have led to new patterns. Regional and local mandates have evolved and are now seen 
as full-time jobs with sufficient salaries. Having a professional political career is therefore no 
longer limited to the national level. Opportunities for politicians have therefore become more 
widespread as a they are now also able to have a long and professional political career at other 
levels, such as at the European level (Borchert & Stolz, 2011, p. 108). The effects of 
professionalization of a state legislatures in the United States were tested by Squire (1992) and 
his results confirm that professionalization leads to an increase of legislators and a decrease of 
members who have other occupations, such as homemakers and business employees. Today the 
European Parliament is one of those highly professionalized institutions as it consists of a large 
group of members with political experience and political ambitions (Norris, 1999, p. 95). Having 
more career politicians does not only influence the attractiveness of the European Parliament; 
theories on professionalization express that the presence of experienced career politicians in the 
European Parliament is important for its development as a strong and effective institution. Such 
an institution is more capable of resisting the powers of national actors and other European 
actors (Norris, 1999, p. 86).  
Scarrow (1997) created an important categorization for analyzing the career paths of MEPs. 
Three different types of MEPs are identified. Firstly there are ‘European careerists’, MEPs who 
serve in the European Parliament for a long time and don’t necessarily intend to use their 
experience on a national level. Secondly there are the ‘domestic careerists’, MEPs who are only 
member of the European Parliament for a short time and use this to obtain a political career in 
national politics. The third category consists of MEPs for whom the European Parliament is the 
end of their political career (Scarrow, 1997, pp. 259-260). This shows that there are different 
career paths linked to those who are a member of the European Parliament. For some the 
European Parliament is a beginning of a political career, others might have already had a long 
political career when becoming a member of the European Parliament. Daniel (2015) states that 
most MEPs either build a career within the European Parliament or use it as a way of obtaining a 
political career in national politics. The presence of MEP’s from the third category, who view the 
European Parliament as a final stage in their political career, is becoming more rare (Daniel, 
2015, p.6). A big part of MEPs have held a political mandate before coming to the European 
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Parliament; only 29 percent of the sample, of MEPs between 1999 and 2004, did not hold a 
mandate in the past. Furthermore Daniel’s findings that the European Parliament is not often the 
final stage of a career are confirmed, as only 11 percent of the sample held no mandate after 
leaving the European Parliament (Feron, Crowley, Giorgi, 2006, pp. 96-97). 
 
Numbers on previous political experience of MEPs show that over the years national 
parliamentary experience has become more common when running for a seat in the European 
Parliament; the percentage of MEPs with national parliamentary experience has risen from 26 
percent in 1989 to 35.7 percent in 2009. Especially among the newer members of the European 
Parliament such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia a big majority of the MEPs have 
national experience. In contrast some of the older member states such as Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands have very few MEPs with former national experience, with 
percentages ranging from 8 to 16 percent. The number of MEPs with national ministerial 
experience has also risen over the past decades; in 1999 just over 10 percent of MEPs had been a 
minister, this number rose to 16 percent in 2004 and to 17.1 percent in 2009. Lastly, the event of 
prime ministers and heads of states becoming members of the European Parliament has become 
more frequent; in the 7th term there were eleven of them. Within the European Parliament these 
prime ministers have occupied prestigious positions; such as committee chairs, chairs of political 
groups and the presidency of the European Parliament (Corbett et al., 2011, pp. 77-80). 
Furthermore members of the European Parliament interviewed by Feron, Cowley and  Giorgi 
(2006) stressed that while experience is not always necessary for gaining a regional or local 
mandate, it is of importance in the European Parliament. National experience is also seen by 
some as very different from a mandate in the European Parliament, as this requires one to have 
more professional relationships and networks. 
 
As the European Parliament has grown to become very professionalized it is likely this has also 
had an effect on the leaderships of the EPGs; consisting of politicians with prestigious political 
careers, such as cabinet experience. 
Research on political careers is usually focused on national careers, while this is only one part of 
a political career. Local and regional politics should also be involved more as there is a strong 
bias to studying political careers on a national level (Borchert & Stolz, 2011, pp. 109-110) 
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Therefore these career paths will also be taken into account, leading to the first hypothesis; 
MEP’s who have been part of a national cabinet are more likely to gain a leadership position 
within a European party group than MEPs who only have local, regional, or national 
experience. 
 
Seniority 
The usage of a seniority as a criteria when allocating certain offices varies from parliament to 
parliament. In Norway for example there is only a small impact of seniority on committee 
assignment and in Finland there is no impact at all (Hagevi, 2000, p. 254-255). However, in the 
United States there is an extensive seniority system as members who have been part of the House 
Of Representatives for a long time are more likely become chairman of a commission than the 
less senior members (Kellerman & Shepsle, 2009, p. 2). Lastly, in the Swedish and- Danish 
parliament the senior members, those who have served in more than five sessions, are more 
likely to be assigned to their preferred commission than those members who have served in four 
sessions or less (Hagevi, 2000, pp. 254-255).  
There is no official seniority system in the European Parliament, but there is a high number of 
new members every term. Though the number of new members, also known as turnover rate, at 
the beginning of a term has been declining since 1994, there was still a turnover rate of 50.4 
percent in 2009 (Whitaker, 2014, p. 1513). Members who are senior are thus still quite an 
exception.  
Daniel (2015) refers to several interviews in which MEPs concluded that they were 
inexperienced in their first years, did not know how to cope with the different negotiation 
processes and did not have a big network. After several years though this changes and they built 
up a more extensive network. Daniel (2015) verifies these claims by using data to test the effect 
of seniority, measured by the numbers of terms MEPs have been part of the European 
Parliament, on report allocation. The results show that seniority is of influence, as members 
receive more rapports when they become more senior. Seniority especially affects MEPs with 
low levels of education; after two completed terms they receive significantly less rapports than 
MEPs with higher education (Daniel, 2015, pp. 96-97). Furthermore interviews conducted by 
Kaeding (2004) on rapporteurship assignment conclude that group experience is of importance as 
it helps acquiring connections and building a reputation within a group. MEPs who are in their 
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first term have no previous group experience and will therefore have less connections than the 
more senior MEPs.  
Although it can be difficult to become a senior member of the European Parliament, Norris and 
Franklin (1997) show that MEPs who had already served a previous term had a more chance to 
gain a seat again in the elections of 1994 than those who were running for the first time. Being in 
the European Parliament for a longer period of time also increases the chances of MEPs gaining 
a committee chair or vice-chair and other leadership positions (Beauvallet and Michon, 2010; in 
Whitaker, 2014, p. 1523).  
The findings described above lead to the second hypothesis: First-term MEPs are less likely to 
obtain a leadership position than MEPs who have already served in a previous term of the 
European Parliament. 
 
Case Selection 
Currently there are 751 members in the European Parliament belonging to eight different 
political groups and a group of non-attached members (European Parliament, n.d
a
). 
 The EPP was the biggest group in the European Parliament after the elections of 2014 with 221 
members and the S&D is the second biggest political group with 191 members. 
 
 
Figure 2. European Parliament election results: 2014
1
 
                                                            
1 Reproduced from: European Parliament, n.d.
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After the S&D the ECR is the biggest group with 70 members, followed by ALDE with 67 
members. The remaining groups make up for the other 272 members. 
 
Data on members from the EPP, S&D and ALDE will be gathered and analyzed. The EPP and 
S&D have always represented the majority of the members of the European Parliament and have 
therefore always played an import role in the European Parliament (Corbett et al., 2007, pp. 109-
110). The EPP and S&D are the two biggest political groups and together can form a majority 
and in this way control the legislative agenda and the allocation of committees. Secondly, 
because these two groups have so much power they make more use of sanctions to make sure 
their members stay loyal to the group (Hix, 2002, p. 690-691).  Data from members from ALDE 
will also be analyzed, not only because of the availability of the data but also because the ALDE 
has a powerful position in the European Parliament. ALDE and the EPP are quite close to each 
other on the left-right position as well as the pro-EU position and therefore often form coalitions 
(Hix, 2009, p. 4). Research on rollcall-voting by Hix and Høyland (2013) also shows that ALDE, 
due to its ideological position, it is able to be a part of an oversized coalition with the EPP and 
S&D, a coalition with parties who are ideologically on the left as well a coalition with parties 
who are positioned more to the right. This gives ALDE a powerful position as they are able to be 
part of a lot of coalitions.  
 
Data and methodology 
The hypotheses will be tested using data on cabinet experience, and seniority within the 
European Parliament. This data was gathered from MEPS who were part of the EPP, S&D or 
ALDE at the beginning of the European Parliament; the elections for the 8
th
 term took place in 
May 2014 and the political groups were formed in June 2014. During the forming of the political 
groups the chairs and vice-chairs were elected. Subsequently, on the first of July, the 8
th
 term 
officially began (European Parliament, 2014). Members from these groups who became a 
member of Parliament later on in the term, replacing MEPs who left, are therefore not included 
in the data set. 
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The primary sources for finding information about the members of the EPP, S&D and ALDE 
were the website European Parliament, websites of the party groups and personal websites. The 
data set is nearly complete as information regarding cabinet experience was found from 470 
members out of the 481 members included in the dataset, data regarding seniority was retrieved 
for all 481 members included in the data set. More information on the sources used for finding 
information about the MEPs included can be found in the appendix. 
 The data will be tested using a binary logistic regression. This binary logistic regression will 
include the dependent variable ‘leadership positon’, the independent variables ‘cabinet 
experience’ and ‘seniority’ and lastly a set of control variables which will be discussed below. 
 
Operationalization of the dependent and independent variables 
For the dependent variable leadership position within an EPG the presidents and vice-presidents 
of the political groups are coded with 1, all the members who do not have a leadership position 
are coded with 0. The first independent variable, previous political experience is coded with 1 
when an MEP has been state secretary, minister or prime minister, thus has been part of a 
cabinet. Members who have not been a state secretary, minister or prime minister are coded with 
0. Finally, the second independent variable seniority is measured by the number of terms an 
MEP has served, even if this was not for the full term of five years, before the start of the current 
8
th
 term. MEPs who are in their first term are coded with 0, MEPs who have already served in a 
previous term are coded with 1. 
 
Control variables 
The binary logistic regression will also include control variables. The first control variable is 
gender. Over the years the number of women in the European Parliament has steadily risen from 
16 percent in 1979 to 37 percent in 2014 (European Parliament, n.d.
c
). There are big differences 
between countries regarding the number of women they send to the European Parliament though. 
Italy sends very few women to the European Parliament, whereas some of the newer member 
states states such as Lithuania and Slovenia have relatively high percentages of female MEPs 
(Corbett et al., 2007, pp. 49-50). A possible explanation for the unequal distribution is that the 
majority of national parliamentarians in members states of the European Parliament are still men. 
Christmas-Best and Kjaer (2007) show that in twelve member states of the European Parliament 
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men still form the majority. The same goes for the number of women in parliamentary elites; the 
number of women in parliamentary elites in nine European countries between 1990 and 2003 is 
still very low with an average of 28.4 percent (Christmas-Best and Kjaer, 2007, p. 100). Though 
the percentage increased from 24.8 percent to 28.4 percent between 1990 and 2003 this was just 
a small increase (Best and Kjaer, 2007, p. 100). As there are less female parliamentarians and 
less females with high political positions at national level, this could be of influence on the 
number of women elected as MEP as well as on the number of women gaining a leadership 
position. Therefore women are coded with 0 and men are coded with 1.  
A second control variable which will be taken into account is education. The number of 
parliamentarians with a low level of education has been declining since the 20
th
 century (Gaxie 
and Godmer, pp. 109-111). Having a high level of education has thus become an important 
condition for entering a national parliament and having a political career in many West-European 
countries (Gaxie and Godmer, 2007, pp. 115-116) .The control variable education is coded 0 
when an MEP does not have any university degree, MEP’s who do have an university degree, 
including a bachelor, master of PhD-degree, are coded with 1.  
The third control variable will consist of data on EPG bureau membership and committee chairs 
before the current 8
th
 term. Members of the bureau are included  because they have certain 
powers since they meet with the group leadership and together coordinate the political activity 
and strategy of the group (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats, n.d.; Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats, n.d.). Committees have always played an important role in the 
European Parliament, carrying out much of the detailed work of the European Parliament. The 
chair of a committee presides over the committee meeting and therefore has significant powers 
(Corbett et al, 2011, pp. 128-129). When an MEP from the EPP, ALDE or S&D has thus been a 
member of the group’ bureau or has been chair of a commission this is coded with 1, those who 
have not part of the group’ bureau or have not been chair of a commission are coded with 0. 
The fourth and final control variable is age. Within the European Parliament a young age does 
not automatically mean that the MEP will have a long career in the European Parliament. As 
younger MEPs are especially ambitious for a job on the national level they are more inclined to 
be loyal towards their national parties and more likely to go against the orders of their group 
leadership (Meserve et al., 2009, p. 1030). It is likely that this would also affect their changes of 
gaining a leadership position. However, it is also possible that  being young is seen as beneficial. 
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The age of the MEPs at the official beginning of the European Parliament, the 1
st
 of July 2014, 
will therefore also be taken into account. 
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Results 
 
What seems contradictory regarding the results in table 1 is that the percentages regarding 
cabinet experience are low. However, those with a leadership position only make up for a small 
percentage of all MEPs, which explains the low percentages. 
 
 
Table 1. Political experience and leadership positions within EPGs  in 2014 (%) 
                                                No cabinet experience          Cabinet experience 
 
No leadership position             94.9                                                 87.1 
Leadership position                  5.1                                                  12.9  
 
N                                              369                                                   101 
                                                        2 (1) = 7.453, p= 0.006 
 
What is obvious though is that there is a higher percentage of members with cabinet experience 
in leadership position, than members with no cabinet experience. 
Table 2 shows that there is noteworthy difference between the senior MEPs and first-term MEPs 
regarding leadership positions as well. The percentage of senior members with a leadership 
position is more than twice as high as the percentage of first-term MEPs. 
 
Table 2. Seniority and leadership positions within EPGs in 2014 (%) 
 
                                                            First-term MEPs                      Senior MEPs        
 
Not in leadership postion                     95.7                                         91.1 
Leadership position                              4.3                                           8.9 
  
  
N                                                   211                                          270 
                                                                   2 (2) = 4.005, p= 0.045 
 
16 
 
Furthermore table 2 shows that the majority of the MEPs of the EPP, S&D and ALDE are not 
first-term MEPs but have already served in previous terms. The turnover rate among those 
groups is therefore lower than the average of all the groups combined. This turnover rate was 
50.4 percent in 2009 (Whitaker, p. 1513, 2014). 
Although table 2 shows that there is quite a difference between the percentages senior members 
having a leadership position and first-time MEPs having a leadership position, this relation does 
not prove to be significant. Cabinet experience does have significant effect on gaining a 
leadership position though.   
 
Table 3. Binary logistic regression of 
 
                                                            Model 1 
(Intercept)                                                                                   -3.420* 
                                                                                                    (1.524) 
Cabinet experience                                                                      1.195** 
                                                                                                    (0.431) 
Seniority                                                                                      0.610 
                                                                                                    (0.455) 
Gender (Ref.=Male)                                                                    -0.766 
                                                                                                    (0.405) 
University degree                                                                        0.668 
                                                                                                    (1.050) 
(Vice)chair of committee or EPG bureau member                      0.312                 
                                                                                                    (0.168) 
Age                                                                                               0.05 
                                                                                                    (0.21) 
-2LL                                                                                             194.999  
Cox and Snell’s R 2                                                                     0.038 
Nagelkerke R 2                                                                            0.095 
N                                                                                                   421 
Note: binary logistic regression coefficients with standard errors between brackets.  
***p < 0,001, **p < 0,010, * p < 0,05 
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It therefore seems that seniority might be of influence, but is not one of the main factors behind 
gaining a leadership position. 
 
Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis was to find out if previous political experience, specifically cabinet 
experience, and seniority acquired in the European Parliament are of influence on gaining a 
leadership position within the European party groups EPP, S&D ALDE. As the leaderships of 
the political groups in the European Parliament have a certain powers, such as committee 
assignment, it is useful to look into these leaderships. Firstly the process of the allocation of 
committee- and  rapporteurship was assessed. Research shows that political experience is not of 
importance when commissions are being allocated and rapporteurs are being appointed. 
Professional work experience and expertise are the main determents  taken into account in the 
allocation process. However, since committees and rapporteurships require a great deal of 
expertise it is difficult to relate these findings to leadership position within an EPG. 
Secondly the development of political careers, and the different types of political careers were 
assessed. MEPs can be divided into the three different groups, as identified by Scarrow. The 
presence of the group containing MEPs who see the European Parliament as the final phase in 
their career is becoming smaller. A big part of the current MEPs now either try to make a career 
in the European Parliament, or use it as a way of getting promoted to national offices. The 
professionalization the European Parliament and presence of MEPs with a great deal of political 
experience therefore lead to the hypothesis that cabinet members are more likely to gain a 
leadership positon than MEPs who have not been part of a national cabinet as state secretary, 
minister or prime minister.  
After assessing political careers, the notion of seniority was analyzed as seniority has a 
noticeable influence on committee assignment in certain national parliaments. In the European 
Parliament there is no official seniority system, but it does have a significant effect on becoming 
rapporteur. Furthermore seniority implies that an MEP has the opportunity to build up a network, 
thereby increasing his changes on gaining sough-after jobs such as leadership of an EPG. MEPs 
who are in their first term do not have such a network, which makes it less likely that they will 
be elected into an a leadership position within an EPG.  
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An original dataset containing data on 481 MEPs from ALDE, S&D and the EPP was used to 
test the effect of cabinet experience and seniority on gaining a leadership position within an 
EPG. Cabinet experience proved to have a significant effect on gaining a leadership position 
within an EPG, seniority however was insignificant.  
 
Discussion 
The binary logistic regression shows that cabinet experience has a significant influence on 
gaining a leadership position within an EPG, confirming the hypothesis that MEPs with cabinet 
experience are more likely to gain a leadership position within an EPG than members with no 
cabinet experience. Seniority does not have a significant influence on gaining a leadership 
position within an EPG though, thus the hypothesis that first-term MEPs are less likely to gain a 
leadership position within an EPG cannot be confirmed. 
 However, the results do have some limitations as all of the variables consisted of just two 
categories. The European Parliament consists of MEPs who have very diverse career 
backgrounds (see Corbett et al., Daniel, 2015), but by dividing the MEPs into just two categories 
the diversity is not correctly reflected. Another limitation of this research is that the results 
cannot be compared with previous terms, this would make the results more valid. Furthermore 
comparing the results with previous terms could confirm if professionalization of the European 
Parliament is indeed associated with leaderships consisting of MEPs with cabinet experience. 
 
Besides cabinet experience and seniority there are other factors which could be of influence on 
gaining a leadership positions. 
National delegations also have an influence on the committee assignment within the EPGs 
(Yordanova, 2009, p. 257). It is therefore a possibility that national delegations exert their 
influence to make sure that MEPs from their delegation are represented in the EPG’ leadership. 
Secondly, some MEPs of the European Parliament also still view the European Parliament as an 
institution where they act mainly as representatives of their country, region or constituency 
(Marsh and Norris, 1997, p. 156). Nationality could therefore still play an important role and is 
something worth looking into for future research when analyzing leaderships of EPGs. 
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Furthermore it is also worth questioning the motives of the MEPs for electing certain candidates 
as chair or vice-chair in general. Assuming people are rational; politicians within a legislative 
institution will try and shape the institution in such a way that it allows them to fulfil their 
individual  interests (Hibbing, 1999, p. 154). MEPs therefore might vote for a fellow group 
member not because that member has so much political experience but because they are of 
personal importance. 
Although previous political experience on the national level was assessed during this thesis, 
political experience gained at other European institutions was not taken into account. Kaeding’s 
(2014) research on report allocation shows that when an MEP has served in a European 
institutions before becoming an MEP this has a significant effect on becoming rapporteur. 
Political experience acquired in other parliamentary assemblies such as the Council of Europe 
and Committee of Regions therefore could have been of influence as well. Furthermore including 
political experience in other European institutions could also shed a different light on seniority. 
If an MEP has a long history of service in another European institution before coming to the 
European Parliament, this might as well also be considered by other MEPs as a sign of seniority. 
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Appendix 
 
An overview of all members currently belonging to each European party group was retrieved 
from the websites of the EPP, ALDE and S&D. However, some of the members displayed on 
their websites were not part of the group at the official beginning on the 1
st
 of July 2014. 
Therefore the list of incoming members on the website of the European Parliament was consulted 
to assure that group members who become MEP after the 1
st
 of July were not included in the 
dataset. For the MEPs who were part of the European Parliament on the 1
st
 of July 2014, but 
have left the European Parliament thereafter the list of outgoing members was consulted. This 
was done because these MEPs are no longer displayed on the websites of their former European 
party group. Information such as seniority, age, party leadership, bureau membership and 
committee chairmanship of MEPs who are no longer part of the European Parliament, but were 
on the 1
st
 of July, was gathered from the directory on the website of the European Parliament. 
This directory included  a history of parliamentary service of each former member. 
Information on seniority, age and committee chairmanship of the MEPs who are still part of the 
European Parliament and were also part of the EPGs on the 1
st
 of July, and therefore included in 
the dataset, was found by consulting the full list of current MEPs on the website of the European 
Parliament. This list is called full list and gives an overview of all the current members. For each 
member a personal profile exists, which among other things includes a history of parliamentary 
service.  
 
To find out if  a certain member of the EPP has been part of a national cabinet in the past, thus 
having been state-secretary, minister or prime minister, the website of the EPP was consulted. 
The website of the EPP contains an overview of all its members, including personal information 
and cv’s. The website of ALDE also contains a full list of all its members including cv’s and 
personal information. However,  cv’s are not included for every member. For the few members 
of ALDE and the EPP whose cv was not included other websites were used. Firstly the website 
of the European Parliament was consulted, since the personal profiles of the members contain 
cv’s, or links to personal websites in some cases. When a cv or link to a personal page was not 
included other websites were consulted.. Through Google personal websites were found, which 
were not included on the personal pages on the website of the European Parliament. When an 
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MEP did not have a personal page other websites were used such as websites of national 
governments and political news pages, Wikipedia was never used as main source.  
  
Lastly, the process of finding political experience of the members of the S&D is similar to the 
process described above. The website of the S&D also provides a full list of all its members with 
personal pages, however this does not include any cv’s at all. For some members a link to their 
website were included though. If this was not the case the search was conducted in the same way 
as described for the missing members of the EPP and ALDE.  
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